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”We don’t perceive that there is a national [housing] bubble but it’s hard not to
see ... that there are a lot of local bubbles.”
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (Economic Club of New York, May 20, 2005; CNN Money)
1 Introduction
In some U.S. metropolitan areas house prices increased dramatically during the last few
years. The increase in house prices is substantial even if one looks at the average state-level
price, which smooths out the diﬀerences across local markets within each state. Figure 1
shows the annualized average growth rates from the ﬁrst quarter of 2001 to the last quarter
of 2004 in the OFHEO (Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight) house price indexes,
deﬂated by the U.S. core PCE inﬂation, for the forty-eight contiguous states. In this four-
year period house price indexes increased more then ten percent per year in several states
on both the East and the West Coasts, notably California, Florida, Nevada, Maryland and
Rhode Island. The rise in house prices has been very uneven across the nation, with some
states, like Texas and Ohio, growing barely above two percent per year. If we compare the
growth in house prices in the last four years with the average growth since 1986, we ﬁnd that
states like Florida have grown three times their average, while other states, like Michigan,
have grown twenty percent less than average.
From the perspective of the current debate, an important question is whether the
widespread, but not homogeneous, increase in house prices reﬂects a national phenomenon
o rr a t h e r ,i nt h ew o r d so fC h a i r m a nG r e e n s p a n ,ac o l l e c t i o no f“ l o c a lb u b b l e s . ” T h ea n -
swer to this question has important policy implications. “Local bubbles” are most likely
attributable to local factors, i.e., circumstances that are speciﬁc to each geographic market,
rather than to monetary policy, which is the same for the entire nation. On the contrary, if
the boom in house prices is a national phenomenon, monetary policy may well be a likely
suspect.
To address the issue of a potential national housing cycle we estimate a dynamic factor
model in the spirit of Geweke (1977), Sargent and Sims (1977), and Stock and Watson (1989),
on state-level OFHEO house price indexes from the mid-eighties to the end of 2004. We then
use the factor model to disentangle the component of the increase in the value of housing
that is common to all states from the component that is idiosyncratic, i.e. speciﬁc to each
state. The latter component is meant to capture the “local bubbles”, while the former2
captures co-movement across all states, and therefore, potentially, what has been referred
to as a “national bubble.” We ﬁnd that historically movements in house prices have mainly
been driven by the local (state- or region-speciﬁc) component. Indeed, growth rates in
OFHEO house price index are far less synchronized across states than are the growth rates
in real per capita income, which are a measure of the business cycle at the state level.
However, the recent period has been diﬀerent in this regard. While for a number of
states local factors are still very important, for many states that experienced large increases
in house prices a substantial fraction of these increases is attributable to the national factor.
How can we reconcile this ﬁnding with the fact that increases in house prices have been
uneven across states? Of course, part of the cross-state heterogeneity is due to local factors.
But about two third the heterogeneity is due to the fact that states have diﬀerent exposures
to the common cycle: Some states, like Iowa or Oklahoma, are barely aﬀected by the
common cycle, while others, for instance most states in the Northeast, are strongly aﬀected.
Since in the recent period the common component of the growth in house prices across
states has been sizable, we ask to what extent monetary policy is behind this co-movement.
Of course there are many other potential causes of the house price boom, such as mortgage
market innovations for instance, but here we focus on one of them only: monetary policy.
We do so because by most accounts, including the Fed’s own FOMC statements, monetary
policy has been expansionary in recent history. In the press, the boom in house prices has
often been associated with loose monetary policy. We follow Bernanke and Boivin (2003)
and estimate a VAR where the common factor in house prices is one of the variables, while
the other variables measure the stance of monetary policy (the federal funds interest rate,
money supply), aggregate U.S. inﬂation and output, and the thirty-year mortgage rate.
We identify monetary policy shocks using sign restrictions ´ a la Uhlig (2005) and Canova
and De Nicol´ o (2002). Perhaps not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that monetary policy has been
expansionary in the recent period, in the sense that most deviations from the implied policy
rule have been on the side of “loose” rather than “tight” monetary policy. The analysis of
impulse responses shows that expansionary monetary policy shocks lead to increase in the
housing factor. We then perform the following counterfactual thought experiment: What
would have been the alternative path of the housing factor had there not been any monetary
policy shocks from the ﬁrst quarter of 2001 onward? And, in turn, what would have been the
counterfactual growth in house prices across states? The results from this counterfactual
experiment indicate that the impact of monetary policy shocks on house prices is non-
negligible, but is small compared with the magnitude of the price increase over the last four3
years. Therefore, our analysis suggests that expansionary monetary policy is not behind the
recent boom in house prices.
While there are established literatures studying the eﬀect of housing on asset pricing,
portfolio choice, business cycles and consumption, the literature on the relationship between
housing prices and monetary policy is fairly limited. Chirinko et. al. (2004) study the
interrelationship between stock prices, house prices, and real activity in a thirteen country
sample. Their primary focus is in determining the role asset prices play in formulating
monetary policy. Iacoviello and Minetti (2005) document the role that the housing market
plays in creating a credit channel for monetary policy. Their empirical analysis uses a
sample of four countries that does not include the U.S. Perhaps the closest study to ours
is Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) who study the eﬀects of monetary policy on regions in
the U.S. from 1966-1998. They ﬁnd that the response of housing investment to monetary
policy varies by region. Our paper diﬀers from the previous literature both in terms of
methodology and of focus. In terms of methodology, we use a factor model to extract the
common cycle in house price ﬂuctuations. In terms of focus, like Fratantoni and Schuh –
and unlike Chirinko et. al. (2004) and Iacoviello and Minetti (2005) – we are interested in
the regional diﬀerences in the response of house prices to policy shocks. Diﬀerently from
all these papers, we are particularly interested in the role of monetary policy in the latest
housing boom.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section (2) describes the dynamic factor model;
section (3) describes the data, section (4) the empirical results, and section (5) concludes.
2M o d e l
Our approach consists of two steps. In the ﬁrst step we use a purely statistical model to tell
the common component of ﬂuctuations in house prices apart from state or region-speciﬁc
ﬂuctuations. In this step we avoid making too many a-priori assumptions on the drivers of
common ﬂuctuations – that is, we let the common factor be latent instead of pre-specifying
a number of regressors. Once we have obtained an estimate of the common factor from the
statistical model, in the next step we investigate what lies behind it – and in particular, we
focus on the role of monetary policy shocks.
Our statistical model is a dynamic factor model estimated via Bayesian methods, as in
Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2005). The model postulates that the observable variables
(yn,t, n =1 ,..,N, t =1 ,..,T ), the growth rates in state-level house price indexes, depend4
on a number of latent factors, which capture comovement at the national (f0
t )o ra tt h e
regional (fr
t ) level, as well as on state-speciﬁc shocks  n,t. Speciﬁcally, the model is:







t +  n,t, (1)
where µn is the average growth rate, which is allowed to diﬀer across states, and βr
n represents
the exposure of state n to factor r. The estimates µn may be of interest in themselves, as
they reﬂect historical trends in terms of state-level demographics, economic growth, etc
cetera, but are not the focus of this paper. This paper focuses on the deviations from the
historical mean, and in particular on the decomposition of these deviations in the recent
period. We impose the natural restriction that βr
n = 0 if state n does not belong to region
r. The section 3 discusses the deﬁnition of regions.








t  N(0,1),r=0 ,..,R., (2)
where the variance of the innovations ur
t is normalized to one. The law of motions for the
state-speciﬁc shocks is given by an AR(pn)p r o c e s s :
 n,t = φn,1 n,t−1 + .. + φn,p n,t−p + un,t,u n,t  N(0,σ2
n). (3)
A key identiﬁcation assumption which allows us to disentangle the factors from one another
and from the state-speciﬁc shocks is that all innovations are mutually independent.
The paper will decompose movements in yn,t into ﬂuctuations due to each of the three
components: national, regional, and state-speciﬁc component. The statistic vn(t0,t 1) com-
putes the variance of ﬂuctuations due to the national factor as the fraction of the sum of


















This variance decomposition is computed for each state n for the entire sample, as well as
for sub-periods of interest, notably the last four years.
The Bayesian procedure used to obtain the posterior distribution of the parameters
of interest, the Gibbs sampler, is straightforward for this model. We now give a brief
description of it. The Gibbs sampler is a zig-zag procedure where a set of parameters is
drawn conditional on another set of parameters, and vice-versa, exploiting the fact that
the conditional posterior distributions have a known form, even if the joint posterior does5
not. The Gibbs sampler for this problem has two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we condition on
the factors and draw all other parameters. Conditional on the factors, each equation (1) is
a regression model with AR(pn) errors. The procedure developed by Chib and Greenberg
(1994) makes it possible to draw µn, βr
n,t, φn,j, σ2
n (see Otrok and Whiteman 1998). Since
the errors are independent across n, the procedure can be applied equation by equation.
The same procedure is applied to the parameters φr
j of the law of motion of the factors (2).
In the second step we draw the factors, conditional on all other parameters. The model
is already written in state-space form, equation (1) being the measurement equation, and
equations (2) and (3) being the transition equation for the unobserved states, which include
both the factors and the idiosyncratic shocks. We can then use the algorithm developed by
Carter and Kohn (1994) (see Kim and Nelson 1999, Cogley and Sargent 2002, and Primiceri
2005) to obtain draws of the states. This approach leads to a curse of dimensionality
however, as the number of states grows proportionally with the cross-sectional dimension
N. A solution to this curse of dimensionality is to pre-whiten the data, that is, to pre-
multiply each measurement equation by 1 −
p
j=1 φn,jLj,s ot og e tr i do ft h ed y n a m i c si n















t + un,t. (5)
To our knowledge, the literature that followed this path has generally conditioned on the p
observations (yn,1,...,y n,p). We use the full sample instead. The extra step required to this
amounts to computing the expectation of the ﬁrst p realizations of the factors conditional
on the initial observations.
The priors used in this paper are quite standard, and similar to those used in Kose,
Otrok, and Whiteman (2005). Importantly, we use identical priors for both the house price
and the real income data sets, obtaining very diﬀerent results in terms of the national/local
factor decomposition, as we will see. This is indirect evidence that the priors do not drive
the main results of the paper. The prior for constant µn is normal with 2 and precision (the
inverse of the variance) 1. The prior for the loadings βr
n is fairly loose: it is Gaussian with
zero mean and precision equal to 1/100. The prior for the idiosyncratic innovation variance
σ2
n is an inverted gamma with parameters 4 and 0.1. The priors for the parameters of the
AR polynomial are Normal with mean zero and precision equal to 1 for the ﬁrst lag, and
then increasing geometrically at rate .75 for the subsequent lags. We choose a lag length
equal to q = 3 for the factors and p = 2 for the idiosyncratic shocks. All priors are mutually
independent.6
3T h e D a t a
Most of the data were obtained from Haver Analytics (Haver mnemonics are in italics). The
Housing Price Index (HPI; HPI@REGIONAL) is published by the Oﬃce of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), and captures changes in the value of single-family homes.
The HPI is a weighted repeat sales index: It measures average price changes in repeat sales
or reﬁnancings on the same properties and weights them (see Calhoun, 1996, for an in-depth
description of how the HPI is constructed). The price information is obtained from repeat
mortgage transactions on single-family properties whose mortgages have been purchased or
securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac since January 1975.1 While the housing price
data has been criticized for its construction, to our knowledge it is the best data available
to the public at the state (or more disaggregated) level.2 Additionally, we will be working
with growth rates of the housing price data so issues related to bias in the level estimates
are not relevant.
We use state level data even though other levels of aggregation (e.g. Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Area) are available. We believe that the state level data is disaggregated enough to
establish our main conclusions, and yet the cross-section is small enough for our computa-
tional approach to be feasible. We compute growth rates using annualized log-diﬀerences,
in percent. The HPI data are nominal. We deﬂate the data using core PCE inﬂation
(JCXFEBM@USECON), which measures inﬂation in the personal consumption expendi-
ture basket less food and energy.
The HPI data are available from 1975, but in our estimation we use only data beginning
in the ﬁrst quarter of 1986. Figure 2 shows that state-level HPI data are extremely noisy for
a number of states before the mid-eighties, with sharp appreciations immediately followed
1An alternative measure that is available at the state level at quarterly frequency is the Conventional
Mortgage Home Price Index (CMHPI), published by Freddie Mac. This measure is roughly based on the
same data on which the OFHEO HPI is constructed. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the correlation between the
growth rates in the two price indexes is above .9 over the entire sample period.
2Some authors, notably Peach and McCarthy (2004), have emphasized the diﬀerences between the
OFHEO house price and the constant quality house price index produced by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
They argue that home renovations and improvements lead to an overstatement of the average growth in the
OFHEO house prices. The constant quality house price index is simply not available at the disaggregated
level. We are aware that the potential mis-measurement of quality can lead to an upward bias in our esti-
mated mean growth rate. However, the average growth rate in house prices is not the focus of the paper.
The focus is on comovements in state-level house prices, especially during the recent boom. From this
perspective, we think that taking home renovations and improvements into account makes little diﬀerence
for our analysis.7
by sharp depreciations. From the perspective of the dynamic factor model, the noise in the
series is not necessarily a problem in terms of estimation, as it is captured by the idiosyncratic
component. However, our methodology cannot deal with very large time variation in the
importance of the noise component, particularly when the time variation is very large as it is
for the HPI data. The noise abates considerably for most states after the mid-eighties. We
choose the ﬁrst quarter of 1986 as the starting date for our analysis (this date is indicated
with a dashed vertical line in Figure 2). Large structural changes in the credit market, such
as the end of regulation Q, provide another reason for leaving the ﬁrst part of the sample
out of the analysis. Additionally, these sample gives us a period with one monetary policy
regime, which is convenient for the identiﬁcation of monetary policy shocks. The sample
ends in the last quarter of 2004. In summary, we have 19 years (76 quarters) of data for the
48 contiguous U.S. states. We have checked for the robustness of our results to moving the
start date to the ﬁrst quarter of 1985, and found that the results to be robust. The real per
capita personal income data (YPPHQ@PIQR) are computed by deﬂating the nominal per
capita income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis using PCE inﬂation.
The regional factors are deﬁned by geography. Our baseline speciﬁcation includes ﬁve
regions. The ﬁrst three regions follow the Census deﬁnition. These are the North-East
Region, which includes the New England and Middle Atlantic Divisions; the Mid-West
Region, which includes the East- and West-North-Central Divisions (the former includes the
Great Lakes regions, while the latter includes the Plains); the West Region, which includes
the Mountains and the Paciﬁc Divisions. We split the South Region, which includes the
South Atlantic, the East-South-Central, and the West-South-Central Divisions, into two
separate regions: South Atlantic and the East-South-Central (i.e., Alabama, Kentucky,
Mississippi, and Tennessee) on one side, and the West-South-Central division (Arkansas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas), which includes a number of oil-producing states, on the other.
We have also tried a speciﬁcation with nine regions, the nine Census Divisions, and obtained
very similar results. The only diﬀerence is that for some of the Divisions with few states the
regional factors were not well identiﬁed, hence we preferred the ﬁve regions speciﬁcation.
The data used in the VAR include two measures of monetary policy, total reserves (in
some speciﬁcations we use non-borrowed reserves as a robustness check) and the federal
funds rate, inﬂation as measured by the GDP deﬂator and real output growth as measured
by the growth in real GDP. All data were taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis
database (FRED). The FRED mnemonics are BOGNONBR, TOTRESNS, FEDFUNDS,
GDPDEF,a n dGDPC1, respectively. The 30 year mortgage rate is obtained from Haver8
Analytics (FCM@USECON). All data are quarterly, and the time-period coincides with that
used in the factor model.
4 Empirical Results
We have three sets of empirical results. The ﬁrst set of results provides evidence on the
relative importance of national versus regional or state-speciﬁc shocks in driving movements
in house prices across US states over the past twenty years. We document that there is a
large degree of heterogeneity across states in regard to relative importance of the national
factors. Overall, however, we ﬁnd that historically movements in housing prices are mainly
driven by local factors, either regional or state-speciﬁc. The second set of results argues
that the recent period has been diﬀerent in this regard. While local factors have remained
important, the increase in house prices that occurred in several states in the last four years
is mainly driven by the national factor. Given the importance of the national factor, in
the third sub-section we ask whether or not expansionary monetary policy lies behind the
recent national housing boom. Speciﬁcally, we identify monetary policy shocks using a VAR
with sign restriction, and investigate their impact on house prices. We ﬁnd the impact of
monetary policy on the housing boom to be non-negligible but small relative to the size of
the housing boom.
4.1 House price ﬂuctuations and business cycles across US states
We ﬁrst want to establish the degree of comovement in housing prices across states. Figure 3
contains three charts. The top charts shows the data – the growth rate in house price
indexes for the forty-eight contiguous states from QI-1986 to QIV-2004. The other two charts
decompose movements in the growth rates into national and local factors. By national factor
(middle chart) we mean the impact of national shocks on state n, that is, the component
β0
n f0
t of equation (1). All lines in the middle chart are perfectly (sometimes negatively)
correlated by construction, with the diﬀerent amplitudes of ﬂuctuations reﬂecting the size of
the exposure β0
n to national shocks. By local factors (bottom chart) we mean the joint impact
of regional and state speciﬁc shocks, that is, the βr
n fr
t +  n,t component of equation (1). The
data show two periods of relatively high volatility in the growth rates. The ﬁrst coincides
with the early part of the sample – from 1986 to the early 1990s. The second coincides with
the most recent period. A diﬀerence between these two episodes is in the role played by local9
factors, as shown by the bottom chart. In the ﬁrst episode local factors are behind most of
the volatility.3 Simply eyeballing the data (top chart) it is very hard to tell whether there is
a common component of house price movements in the late eighties and early nineties, for
any co-movement is shadowed by the importance of local factors. In contrast, in the recent
episode the common component is quite apparent. Except for a few states, notably Nevada
and California, the volatility in local factors in the recent period (2001-2004) is no higher
than it had been in the previous four years.
Figure 4 shows the same decomposition for state-level growth rate in real per capita
income. Real per capita income can be seen as a proxy for state-level business cycles (output
is not available at the quarterly level). The model used on the real income data is the same,
including the speciﬁcation of all the priors, as that used on the house price data. The data
sets however are quite diﬀerent, and so are the results of the decomposition. First, state-level
real income growth rates are less volatile than the house price data, with some exceptions for
rural states like North Dakota. Second, state-level business cycles appear to move more in
step than ﬂuctuations in house prices. Local factors are important, but appear to be largely
short frequency deviations from the common component. Finally, for the income data there
is no evidence of the two high volatility episodes that characterize the house price data. In
particular, not much is happening toward the end of the sample.
Figure 5 quantiﬁes the relative importance of the national factor for the house price
and the income data over the entire sample. In particular, for each state the ﬁgure shows
the magnitude vn(1,T) (see equation (4)), that is, the variance of ﬂuctuations due to the
national factor as a fraction of the variance of all components, for housing on the horizontal
axis and for income on the vertical axis. For all states that are above the 45 degree line the
common component of ﬂuctuations is more important for income than it is for house prices.
Three-quarter of states are above the 45 degree line. For the median state the national factor
explains only ﬁfteen percent of the variance of house price movements. Only for a quarter
of states the national factor is the main driver of movements in house prices, meaning that
the national component drives ﬁfty percent or more of the ﬂuctuations. This is in contrast
with state-level business cycles. For the median state the national factor explains about
ﬁfty percent of the variance in real per-capita income growth.
Recent literature (see for instance McCarthy and Peach, 2004) tries to explain the recent
increase in house prices by means of an aﬀordability index, which measures the extent to
3Some of the local factors are correlated across subsets of states, as they represent regional shocks to the
South West and Mid West regions.10
which current house prices are “aﬀordable” given the level of income and of mortgage interest
rates. The underlying idea is that as income grows and interest rates decline, households
bid up house prices because they simply can aﬀord them (that is, the mortgage payments
remain constant as a fraction of income). This theory posits a tight relationship between
income and house prices. The state-level evidence presented here presents a challenge to
this theory, as it shows that local factors dominate ﬂuctuations in house prices, at least in
the ﬁrst part of the sample, but not in per-capita income. An interesting hypothesis, which
we do not investigate further in this paper, is that segmentation in the mortgage markets
up until the mid-nineties lies in part behind the importance of the local factors.
4.2 The recent housing price boom
Figure 6 plots the posterior median of estimated national housing factor f0
t (black, scale
on the left axis), the ninety percent bands (dotted lines), as well as the OFHEO U.S. price
index (gray, right axis). The ﬁgure shows that the recent period, particularly the last two
years, has been one of unprecedented volatility at the national level. The questions we try to
address in this section are twofold. First, are these shocks at the national level, or are local
factors, behind the recent increase in house prices across many U.S. states? Quantitatively,
what is the relative importance of the two? Second, to what extent can diﬀerent exposures
to national shocks explain the heterogeneity across states in the house price increases?
Figure 6 also shows that the estimated national factor and the OFHEO U.S. price index
are very correlated, particularly in the second part of the sample. This ﬁnding may call
into question the need to estimate a factor model to perform the exercise conducted in this
paper: Can’t we simply use the U.S. price index? Moreover, doesn’t the fact that the U.S.
price index grew so much in the last two years provide by itself evidence that the increase
in house prices is a national phenomenon? The answer to both questions is that there is
an identiﬁcation problem behind the U.S. price index that makes it hard to solve the “local
versus national factors” question just by staring at it. The U.S. price index is a weighted
average of the state-level indexes, where the weights are proportional to the size of the states.
A key issue in the debate is whether the increase in the national index reﬂects a national
phenomenon, or local phenomena in a number of very highly populated (and therefore highly
weighted) states, like Florida or California. In econometric terms, averages (such as the U.S.
price index) are good estimates of factors only under the condition that the weights on each
single component are negligible – a condition that is certainly not met in the case of the
U.S. price index. The factor model is designed to address this identiﬁcation problem. The11
model tries to extract the common component of ﬂuctuations across states, without having
any information on the relative weight of each state: ex ante, all states weight the same in
the factor model.
In order to quantify the importance of national shocks relative to local factors in the
recent period w e plot for each state the the magnitude vn(t0,t 1) for the sub-sample 2001-
2004 on the vertical axis, and 1986-2000 on the horizontal axis in Figure 7. Again, vn(.,.)
represents the variance of house prices ﬂuctuations in state n due to the national factor as
a fraction of the variance of all components. For all states that are above the 45 degree line
the common component of ﬂuctuations is more important in the recent period than in the
remainder of the sample. Figure 7 shows only the the median of the posterior distribution of
vn(QI-1986,QIV-2000)a n dvn(QI-2001,QIV-2004), but in general these magnitudes are tightly
estimated: The diﬀerence vn(QI-1986,QIV-2000)−vn(QI-2001,QIV-2004) is always statistically
signiﬁcant. Between 2001 and 2004 the relative importance of national shocks has increased
for all but one state, Florida. For the median state the explanatory power of the national
factor in terms of the variance of house price movements has increased three-fold, from 11
to 34 percent. Overall the ﬁgure provides evidence that the recent period is diﬀerent from
the rest of the sample, in that the relative importance of national shocks has increased
substantially. Even in the recent period, heterogeneity across states is large – for a number
of South-western and Mid-western states the importance of the national factor remains
negligible even in the last four years. For many states local factors are still the dominant
source of ﬂuctuations. However, we now proceed to show that for many of the states that
witnessed large increases in house prices, the national factor lies behind such increases.
Figure 8 shows two bars for each of the forty-eight contiguous states, one in dark and one
in light gray. The dark gray bar represents the annualized average growth rates for the 2001-
2004 period in the OFHEO house price index, expressed in real terms, which was also shown
in Figure 1. The only diﬀerence is that in Figure 8 the growth rates are computed in excess
of the historical (1986-2004) mean, that is, we show
QIV-2004
t=QI-2001(yn,t−µn)/16. The light gray
bar represents the component of the average growth rates for the same period that can be
attributed to the national factor. Speciﬁcally, for each state the ﬁgure shows the median




t /16.4 The ﬁgure shows that a substantial
fraction of the cross-state heterogeneity in the recent housing price boom is attributable
4To avoid cluttering the picture, we do not show the ninety percent bands for both the demeaned data and
the component attributable to the national factor (the ﬁgure is available upon request). Taking estimation
uncertainty into account does not alter the conclusions.12
to the fact that states have diﬀerent exposures to the national factor. Indeed, the cross-
sectional variance in the component of house price growth explained by the common factor
(light gray bars) amounts to about seventy percent of the cross-sectional variance in average
house price growth (dark gray bars). Of course, local factors – shown by the distance
between the dark and the light gray bars – are still important, especially for states like
California and Nevada. But it is certainly not the case that all cross-state heterogeneity in
the house price boom is driven by “local bubbles”.5
4.3 Expansionary monetary policy and the housing price boom
We have so far made a case that the national factor has been important in the 2001-2004
period. What economic forces are behind the common factor? The answer must lie in a
common set of shocks or changes to the housing market. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to analyze all possible explanations for the house price boom. Here, we focus on one
of the most likely potential culprits, monetary policy shocks. By most accounts, including
the Fed’s own FOMC statements, monetary policy has been expansionary in recent history.
In the press, the boom in house prices has often been associated with loose monetary policy.
This section uses a VAR to investigate the importance of monetary policy shocks in driving
the common component of house price increases in the recent period.
The VAR includes standard macroeconomic data, as well as our estimates of the common
house price factor. We use some newly developed VAR identiﬁcation techniques that require
minimal assumptions to identify and extract monetary shocks. We then use the identiﬁed
shocks in a counterfactual experiment where we eliminate these shocks from QI-2001 on
to create a counterfactual housing price factor. Next, we are able to identify the eﬀects
of this shock on each state house price index via its factor loading or sensitivity to the
national cycle. These calculations give us an idea on the magnitude of the importance of
expansionary monetary policy on housing prices.
The virtue of our approach is that we can combine of a small number of national level
variables and with a wide selection of regional variables capturing local economic conditions
5What state-speciﬁc characteristics drive the diﬀerences in exposures to the common factor is an inter-
esting question which we leave for further research. We observe that the size of the light gray bars (that is,
the magnitude of the exposures) has a clear geographical pattern: It is generally large for states on both
the East and the West coasts – states where ﬂuctuations in residential land prices are likely to be larger
(see Davis and Heathcote 2004), possibly because of zoning and other land use controls (see Glaeser and
Gyourko, 2002), and small for states in the center of the country.13
without loosing too many degrees of freedom (see Bernanke and Boivin 2003). The factor-
augmented-VAR thus yields a parsimonious model that allows us to study the eﬀects of
national shocks on regional economies. A similar approach was developed by Otrok and
Terrones (2004) to study the eﬀects of US monetary policy shocks on global house prices.
The reduced form VAR is given by:
Yt = A(L)Yt−1 + et,e t  N(0,Σ), (6)
where Yt is an m×1 vector that includes observable data as well as the housing factor and
A(L) is a matrix lag polynomial. Ideally, one would estimate the VAR coeﬃcients as part
of the MCMC algorithm and allow the uncertainty in the estimates of the factors to be
captured in the uncertainty in the VAR parameters and the impulse response functions (see
Bernanke, Boivin, Eliasz 2005) . However, since estimating the dynamic factor model itself
is computationally costly, combining this with estimating and identifying the VAR at each
step of the MCMC algorithm would be computationally very costly.6 Given how tightly the
latent factors are estimated (see Figure 6), we believe this to be a relatively minor issue.
The identiﬁcation of monetary shocks is controversial. We identify monetary shocks
using a sign restrictions approach introduced by Faust (1998) and further developed by
Uhlig (2005) (see also Canova and DeNicol´ o 2002). Under this approach identiﬁcation is
achieved by placing restrictions on the sign of the impulse responses with respect to the
shock(s) of interest for some variables for a number of periods in the future. For example,
after a contractionary monetary policy shock we restrict the impulse response function of
reserves to be non-positive, and that of interest rates to be non-negative. One advantage
of Uhlig’s procedure is that it allows one to identify only the innovation of interest (here as
in Uhlig’s work, monetary policy shocks), without making assumptions on the remainder of
the system. A second advantage is that by changing the set of variables that are subject
to the sign restrictions one can analyze the outcome of a variety of diﬀerent identiﬁcation
approaches. We exploit this feature by exploring a number of them, which we describe
below. We then pick the identiﬁcation that gives the largest impact of monetary policy
shocks on the house factor, thereby showing an upper bound on the importance of policy
shocks.
Our VAR consists of six variables: the house factor, total reserves, CPI inﬂation, GDP
growth, the thirty-year mortgage rate and the Federal Funds rate. The VAR is estimated
6Our identiﬁcation procedure, described below, is based on sign restrictions. This procedure requires
many draws of potential impulse response functions and is also computationally intensive procedure. It is
the combination of this procedure with the dynamic factor model that is infeasible.14
using quarterly data and has four lags. We use a standard Litterman prior for the VAR
coeﬃcients. The ﬁrst four variables are in growth rates while the fed funds rate and mortgage
rate are ﬁrst diﬀerenced. We then identify the (contractionary) monetary shock as the shock
that results in a set of impulse response functions consistent with 1) a increase in the Fed
Funds rate, 2) a non-positive change in growth of total reserves, 3) a non-positive change
in CPI growth, 4) a non-positive change in GDP growth. These restrictions hold for three
quarters after the shock. We leave the responses to the house factor and the mortgage
rate unrestricted. The restriction on the response of CPI inﬂation and GDP growth to
be non-positive in response to a contractionary monetary shock is not without controversy.
Indeed, the former is at the center of the ’price-puzzle’ debate while the latter has generated
controversy in the literature (Uhlig 2005). Among the alternatives identiﬁcation schemes
we study are: i) leaving CPI and GDP unrestricted, ii) constraining the impact on the
mortgage rate to be non-negative, and iii) changing the number of quarters for which the
restrictions have to hold to two. We also considered alternative model speciﬁcations, where
we include non-borrowed reserves in place of total reserves, or alternatively include both
measures of reserves. In another speciﬁcation we use both the Fed Funds rate and mortgage
rates in levels. Finally, we increased the lag lengths for the VAR to ﬁve and six lags. For
none of these alternative identiﬁcation schemes/model speciﬁcations is the impact of policy
shocks on the house factor is larger than reported.
Figure 9 displays the impulse response function of all of the variables to the monetary
policy shock, along with the 68 percent posterior coverage intervals. The house factor shows
a signiﬁcant and persistent drop following the contractionary monetary shock. This result
conﬁrms that monetary policy shocks can impact housing prices. The size of that response
on states varies according to each state’s exposure to the common cycle. States with larger
exposure to the common factor will have a stronger response to the monetary shock than
those with smaller factor loadings. The mortgage rate increases after the shock, although the
uncertainty surrounding the size of the impact is large, and the posterior coverage intervals
include zero. For all other variables the responses are constrained, at least for the ﬁrst three
period after impact, so little interpretation need be given to these responses.
Perhaps of greater interest than the shape and signiﬁcance of the impulse response
function for housing prices to the monetary shock is the quantitative importance of the
recent policy choices on the housing price boom. To address this issue we construct a
counterfactual where we create a new set of “data” for all variables in our VAR after setting
the structural monetary shocks equal to zero from QI-2001 until the end of the sample. This15
experiment is in the same spirit of Uhlig (2001) who constructs a counterfactual to identify
whether or not markets were surprised by the decline in interest rates. That is, he backs
out the structural shocks to determine whether or not policy diﬀered from the past in this
period. Here we back out the monetary shocks to determine their eﬀect on housing prices.
Figure 10 shows the actual (solid line) and the counterfactual (dash-and-dotted line) paths
for the Fed Funds rate and the housing factor from this procedure. The diﬀerence between
the actual and the counterfactual Fed Funds rate is not very large, but is not negligible
either. Toward the end of the sample, the counterfactual Fed Funds rate is about seventy
basis points higher than the actual fed funds rate. Other multivariate models used in policy
analysis that are estimated using a diﬀerent sample and diﬀerent variables, such as the
Atlanta Fed BVAR for instance (see Zha 1998), produce a counterfactual Fed Funds rate
that is not very diﬀerent from the one shown here (if anything, closer to the actual path).
Consistently with the results for the impulse response functions, the counterfactual housing
factor is generally below the actual one, especially toward the end of the period where the
diﬀerence between the two is about one percent. Visually, the actual and counterfactual
housing factors are close to each other, suggesting that the impact of policy shocks on house
prices is not large.
However, it is hard to get a quantitative sense of the importance of policy shocks from
the Figure 10, both because the factor is scale-free and because the impact may cumulate
over time. For this reason, Figure 11 shows the impact of policy shocks across the forty-
eight states, relative to the overall impact of the national housing factor. Speciﬁcally,
the dark gray bars in Figure 11 represent the component of the average growth rates in




t /16 that were also shown in Figure 8. The light gray bars quantify the




t − ˜ f0
t )/16,
where by ˜ f0
t we denote the counterfactual factor. In other words, the light gray bars show
how smaller growth in house prices would have been in absence of policy shocks in state n
(or larger, if state n has negative exposure to the national factor). Figure 11 shows that
the impact of monetary policy shocks has been non-negligible, but fairly small: at most one
percent in terms of average growth. Again, these ﬁgures are an upper bound among all the
speciﬁcations/identiﬁcation schemes we considered.
In summary, this section’s ﬁndings are: i) the Fed, while following a slightly more
expansionary policy than in the past did not deviate substantially from “business as usual”
in the recent period; and ii) to the extent that the Fed did pursue an overly accommodative16
policy, the impact of this policy on house prices has been small relative to the overall housing
price increase of the last ﬁve years. Given that in the popular press loose monetary policy
is sometimes blamed for the housing bubble, our ﬁndings may be relevant to the current
debate. Our result that the impact of monetary policy shocks on house prices was small in
the recent period does not of course imply that the low interest rate environment experienced
by the US economy is not responsible for the housing boom. Here, we only consider the
component of the low interest rate that is attributable to policy shocks – that is, to the
Fed deviating from its historical policy rule in an expansionary way. Had the Fed reacted
diﬀerently to the environment – had it followed a diﬀerent rule – the results might have been
quite diﬀerent. This is a much more diﬃcult question that (because of the Lucas’ critique)
goes beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Conclusions
We use a dynamic factor model estimated via Bayesian methods to disentangle the relative
importance of the common component in OFHEO house price movements from state- or
region-speciﬁc shocks. Our sample consists of quarterly data from 1986 to 2004. We ﬁnd
that historically ﬂuctuations in house prices have mainly been driven by the local (state-
or region-speciﬁc) component. Indeed, growth rates in OFHEO house price index are less
synchronized across states than are the growth rates in real per capita income, which are a
measure of the business cycle at the state level. In the recent (2001-2004) period, however,
“local bubbles” have been important in some states, but that overall the increase in house
prices is a national phenomenon. We then use a VAR to investigate the extent to which
expansionary monetary policy is responsible for the common component in house price
movements. We ﬁnd the impact of policy shocks on house prices to be small relative to the
size of the recent housing price increase.
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Figure 1: Cross-state Heterogeneity in the Recent House Price Boom








Notes: The ﬁgure shows shows the annualized average growth rates from the ﬁrst quarter of 2001 to the last
quarter of 2004 in the OFHEO (Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight) house price indexes, deﬂated by
the U.S. core PCE inﬂation, for the forty-eight contiguous states.20
Figure 2: Growth Rates in State-level House Prices (Real): 1975-2004











Notes: The ﬁgure shows the growth rates in OFHEO house price indexes for the forty-eight contiguous U.S. sates
for the period 1975-2004. The vertical line marks QI-1986, the beginning of the sample period used in this paper.
The nominal house price indexes are deﬂated using the core PCE inﬂation.21
Figure 3: State-level Real House Price Growth: National and Local Factors


















Notes: The top chart shows the growth rates in OFHEO house price indexes for the forty-eight contiguous U.S.
sates from QI-1986 to QIV-2004. The nominal house price indexes are deﬂated using the core PCE inﬂation. The










t +  n,t component of equation (1). For all estimated quantities we show the median of the posterior
distribution. See section 3 for a description of the data.22
Figure 4: State-level Business Cycles: National and Local Factors


















Notes: The top chart shows the growth rates in real per-capita income for the forty-eight contiguous U.S. sates
from QI-1986 to QIV-2004. The middle chart (national factor) shows the impact of national shocks on state n,




t of equation (1). The bottom chart (local factors) shows the joint impact of regional




t +  n,t component of equation (1). For all estimated quantities we
show the median of the posterior distribution. See section 3 for a description of the data.23
Figure 5: Variance Decomposition: Housing vs Income


































































Notes: The ﬁgure shows the variance of ﬂuctuations due to the national factor as a fraction of the variance of
all components (referred to in the paper as vn(1,T), see equation (4)) for housing on the horizontal axis and for
income on the vertical axis. The sample period is QI-1986 to QIV-2004. The ﬁgure shows the the median of the
posterior distribution of vn(1,T).24
Figure 6: The National House Price Factor and the U.S. OFHEO House Price
Index

















Notes: The ﬁgure plots the national housing factor f
0
t (black, scale on the left axis), the ninety percent bands
(dotted lines), as well as the OFHEO U.S. price index (gray, right axis). f
0
t is the median posterior estimate of
the factor from equation (1).25
Figure 7: Variance Decomposition, Housing: 1986-2000 vs 2001-2004




































































Notes: Figure 7 plots for each state the the magnitude vn(t0,t 1) for the sub-sample 2001-2004 on the vertical axis,
and 1986-2000 on the horizontal axis. vn(.,.) represents the variance of house prices ﬂuctuations in state n due to
the national factor as a fraction of the variance of all components. The ﬁgure shows the median of the posterior
distribution of vn(t0,t 1) obtained from estimating the model over the entire sample period.26
Figure 8: Cross-state Heterogeneity in the Recent House Price Boom: The
Role of the National Factor







Notes: The ﬁgure shows for each of the forty-eight contiguous states the annualized average growth rates in real
OFHEO house price index (dark gray bars) in excess of the historical (1986-2004) mean for the 2001-2004 period:
 QIV-2004
t=QI-2001(yn,t − µn)/16. The light gray bar represents the component of the average growth rates for the same







Figure 9: Housing and Monetary Policy: Impulse Responses





























































Notes: The ﬁgure displays the impulse response function of all of the variables to the monetary policy shock, along
with the 68 percent posterior coverage intervals.28
Figure 10: Actual and Counterfactual Interest Rate and Housing Factor
















Notes: The ﬁgure shows the actual (solid line) and the counterfactual (dash-and-dotted line) paths for the Fed
Funds rate and the housing factor. The counterfactual paths are obtained by shutting down monetary policy
shocks from QI-2004 to the end of the sample.29
Figure 11: Cross-state Heterogeneity in the Recent House Price Boom: As-
sessing The Role of Monetary Policy Shocks











Notes: The dark bars in the ﬁgure represent the component of the average growth rates in the 2001-1004 period






t /16, for each of the forty-eight
contiguous states. These are the same quantities also shown in Figure 8. The light bars quantify the impact of
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the counterfactual factor.